Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: theory and evidence from Mexico^{*}

David Mckenzie^a and Hillel Rapoport^b ^a Department of Economics, Stanford University ^b Stanford Center for International Development (SCID) and Bar-Ilan University

> October 2003 PRELIMINARY, COMMENTS WELCOME

Abstract

International migration is costly and initially only the middle class of the wealth distribution may have both the means and incentives to migrate, increasing inequality in the sending community. However, the migration networks formed lower the costs for future migrants, which can in turn lower inequality. This paper shows both theoretically and empirically that wealth has a nonlinear effect on migration, and then examines the empirical evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and inequality in rural sending communities in Mexico. After instrumenting, we find that the overall impact of migration is to reduce inequality across communities with relatively high levels of past migration. We also find some suggestive evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship among communities with a wider range of migration experiences.

JEL Classification: O15, J61, D31. **Keywords:** Migration, remittances, inequality, network effects.

^{*}Corresponding author: David Mckenzie: mcken@stanford.edu. Thanks to Nicole Hildebrandt, Cristobal Huneeus and Pascal Lévy-Garboua for excellent research assistance. Nadia Flores at the Mexican Migration Project provided helpful information necessary to calculate distance measures. We are grateful for financial support for this project from the Rockefeller Foundation.

1 Introduction

The United States-Mexico border is the longest between a developed and developing country in the world and there is a long history of migration between the two countries. Escobar Latapí et al. (1998) report that the number of Mexicans employed in the United States in a typical year is equivalent to one-eighth of Mexico's labor force.¹ This paper examines the impact of these large emigrant flows on inequality in the rural sending communities in Mexico. Inequality is often of intrinsic interest for a variety of political and equity-based considerations. In addition, income distribution in Mexico displays a high level of inequality by international standards, and there is now a large body of both theoretical and empirical research which suggests that inequality can retard growth.² To the extent that emigration is non-neutral with respect to inequality, it can therefore have important political and growth consequences for rural Mexico.

What is the overall impact of international migration on economic inequality at origin? The answer to this question is a priori unclear, depending on where migrants are drawn from in the initial wealth or income distribution, and on the impacts of their migration decisions on other community members. Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) argue that initial wealth plays two key roles in determining whether a given individual will migrate. Households at the top of a community's income distribution have lower incentives to send members abroad than middle- and low-income households, since their income earning opportunities and social status are higher to begin with. However, while the poorest rural households may stand to benefit the most from emigration, migration is costly and in the presence of liquidity constraints, they may be unable to bear the cost of sending members abroad. The result is that if migration costs are sizeable, migrants are initially primarily drawn from the upper-middle of the community wealth distribution, causing inequality to initially increase as they get richer from income earned abroad. In contrast, if migration costs are low or liquidity constraints do not bind, the lower part of the distribution is also able to migrate, resulting in a more neutral or even inequality-reducing effect of income remittances.

Most migrants making their first trip from Mexico to the U.S. do so without documents, making the process of migrating an even more risky and costly enterprise. Sociologists have emphasized the role that social networks play in reducing these costs. Espinosa and Massey (1997) report that social networks play a big role in mitigating the hazards of crossing the border, with friends and relatives with previous migrant experience often accompanying new immigrants across the border, showing them preferred routes and techniques of clandestine entry. They can arrange smugglers, or "coyotes", to transport the migrant across the border, and may provide temporary housing and financial assistance

¹Measurement of the exact number of migrants is notoriously difficult, due in large part to substantial temporary migration of a highly seasonal nature and to most of the migration being undocumented. See USCIR (1998) for discussion and estimates.

 $^{^2 {\}rm See},$ for example, the recent surveys by Benabou (1996) and Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (1999).

in the U.S. Munshi (2003) finds that individuals with larger networks are more likely to be employed and to hold higher paying jobs upon arrival in the U.S. As a result, net migration costs become endogenous to the migration process, as modelled theoretically in Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996), and migration is likely to have different effects on inequality at different levels of the migration process.

Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988) therefore emphasize that the distributional consequences of migration are unlikely to be the same at all points in a village's migration history. In the presence of liquidity constraints and initially high migration costs, the first households to migrate are likely to be from the upper end of the income distribution, and consequently, their remittances tend to increase inter-household inequality. However, villagers who have successfully migrated can then provide information to other community members, lowering their effective migration costs and allowing migration to diffuse throughout the remainder of the income distribution, reversing any initially unfavorable effects of remittances on income inequality. They analyze the direct effect of remittance income in two villages in Michoacán, Mexico, by comparing the Ginis with and without remittance income³, and find that in both cases, remittances reduce inequality, but that the decline is greater in the village with more migration experience. They take this finding to be supportive of their hypothesis that remittances have a more equalizing effect at higher levels of past migration experience.

We begin by writing down a simple theoretical model of rural migration, show that it leads to an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration and wealth for a given cost of migration, and then examine the consequences of changes in costs and benefits which might arise from the presence of networks. This non-monotone migration-wealth relationship is then confirmed empirically in data from Mexico, and we find that networks still play a strong role in the migration decision, even after controlling for wealth. The main focus of our paper then lies in examining the empirical evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and inequality in the sending communities. We employ two data sets for this purpose. The first consists of data from 57 rural communities in Mexico collected as part of the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), while the second consists of data on 97 rural municipalities from the national demographic dynamics survey (ENADID). Both data sets provide detailed information on migration, but do not collect income or consumption data. To measure inequality, we therefore employ methods recently developed in McKenzie (2003), which allow us to measure inequality at the community level from data on indicators of household infrastructure and asset ownership. This enables us to construct data on inequality and migration for a large number of communities with a range of different migration experiences, in contrast to previous case studies which focus on only a couple of villages, typically in areas of high emigration.

The MMP surveys ask retrospective histories of migration, and enable us

³They treat remittances as an exogenous transfer in these calculations.

to examine the impact of past emigration to the U.S. on current inequality among members of sending communities in Mexico. Since there are likely to be unobserved factors correlated with both the migration decision and current inequality, we employ an instrumental variables strategy to isolate the overall effect of migration on inequality, allowing for nonlinearity in this relationship. The main instruments employed are historic state-level migration rates and U.S. labor market conditions. Using this instrumenting strategy, we find that migration reduces inequality among the MMP communities, with a larger effect on asset inequality than on income or consumption inequality. Many of the MMP communities have high levels of past migration, which may mean they are already past any turning point in the inequality-migration relationship. The ENADID therefore allows us to examine communities with a wider range of migration levels, and since we have data on these communities for both 1992 and 1997, determine whether changes in migration result in changes in inequality over this period. In these communities we do find some suggestive evidence for an inverse U-shaped relation, with the turning point occurring before the migration levels of many MMP communities.

As noted above, previous literature has not examined the overall impact of migration on inequality, focusing instead on examination of the effect of remittances alone on inequality in only a couple of communities.⁴ Early efforts treated remittance income as an exogenous transfer, and compared Gini coefficients with and without the inclusion of remittance income. Following this approach with national data from Yugoslavia, Milanovic (1987) finds that remittances increase inequality among agricultural households. Noting that migrant workers would otherwise be working and earning income at home, Adams (1989) predicts what income would have been without remittances. Using a sample of three villages in Egypt, he then finds that the inclusion of remittances from abroad worsens inequality. In contrast, following the same approach with households from 4 districts in Pakistan, Adams (1992) concludes that remittances have an essentially neutral impact on the rural income distribution. Taylor (1992) and Taylor and Wyatt (1996) note that in addition to the direct immediate impact on income, remittances can ease credit constraints for liquidity constrained households. Using a sample of 55 households from one part of Michoacán in Mexico, they find evidence that remittances translate into greater increases in income for rural households with illiquid assets. By allowing poorer households access to credit, remittances also finance the accumulation of productive assets, increasing future income. These indirect effects of remittances act to equalize incomes, and they find that remittances reduce inequality, with a greater effect once the indirect effects are included. Barham and Boucher (1998) follow on from Adams, in treating remittances as a substitute to home production. Using data from 3 neighborhoods in Bluefields, Nicaragua, they estimate a double-selection model to allow for the counterfactual of no migration and no remittances to impact on the participation decisions and earning outcomes of other household mem-

 $^{^4 \}mathrm{See}$ Rapoport and Docquier (2003a) for an overview of the economic determinants and consequences of migrants' remittances.

bers. Treating remittances as exogenous would lead them to conclude that remittances reduce income inequality, whereas treating them as a substitute for home earnings results in remittances increasing inequality.

Our methods allow, and indeed force, us to examine the overall impact of migration on inequality. This overall impact includes the direct effect of remittances and the spillover effects of remittances on own production and household labor supply studied in the previous literature. However, it also includes the network effects of migration on the costs and benefits of migration for other community members, multiplier effects of remittances through their spending on products and services produced by other community members (Adelman, Taylor and Vogel (1988)), and other potential spillover and general equilibrium effects. Although we are unable to break down the separate effect of each channel on inequality, we do believe these additional indirect effects are important and need to be included in studying the migration-inequality relationship.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 summarizes the method used to construct measures of inequality from data on asset indicators, and Section 5 empirically examines the effect of wealth and networks on the migration decision. Section 6 contains the main results of the paper, examining the effect of migration on inequality, while Section 7 concludes.

2 The model

Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) emphasize two key roles for initial wealth in determining whether a given individual will migrate: increases in wealth raise the returns to domestic production, increasing the opportunity cost of migrating, but also relax credit constraints which restrict the amount of costly migration. We provide a simple static model of an agricultural household's migration decision to illustrate these duel roles of wealth on migration, and derive the resulting relationship between migration, wealth, and migration costs.

Consider a family of size N making its living from agriculture, with initial illiquid household wealth A, such as land holdings. Family members are assumed to live for two periods, with income equally shared between members of the same family. In the first period, all members are in Mexico, and each household member inelastically supplies one unit of labor to household production. Total farm production with L workers is $AL - \frac{bL^2}{2}$. The marginal product of farm labor is linearly increasing in wealth and decreasing in the number of workers, and there is no outside labor market.⁵ A household member can migrate to the U.S. and earn the foreign wage w by incurring a fixed migration cost c, which is initially assumed to be fixed and exogenous. Credit market imperfections prevent borrowing, and so no household member can migrate in the first period. In the second period, households may use savings from the first period to finance

 $^{^{5}}$ All the model is written in terms of farm production, it can also be more generally applied to other home production and family businesses, in which labor is a complement to capital in production.

migration, after having met the first period subsistence needs of I per member. We assume w > I and that $A - \frac{bN}{2} \ge I$. The household's problem is to chose the proportion of members who migrate, m. We assume no discounting, so the household makes this decision to maximize second period household income net of migration costs, subject to the subsistence constraint. That is, the households problem is:

$$\max_{\{m\}} AN \left(1 - m\right) - \frac{bN^2 \left(1 - m\right)^2}{2} + Nm \left(w - c\right)$$

s.t. $A - \frac{bN}{2} - mc \ge I$ (1)

Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the subsistence constraint in (1). Then the first-order condition with respect to m is:

$$-AN + bN^{2} (1 - m) + N (w - c) - \lambda c = 0$$

Rearranging, we can solve for the optimal household migration rate, m^* , as:

$$m^* = 1 - \frac{[A - (w - c)]}{bN} - \frac{\lambda c}{bN^2}$$
(2)

The Lagrange multiplier $\lambda = 0$ unless (1) binds. When (1) binds, we can solve for the constrained migration rate:

$$\widetilde{m} = \frac{1}{c} \left(A - \frac{bN}{2} - I \right) \tag{3}$$

Equating (2) and (3) allows us to solve for λ when (1) binds:

$$\lambda = \frac{N}{2c^2} \left(2bNc - 2\left[A - w + c\right]c - 2bNA + b^2N^2 + 2bNI \right)$$
(4)

From (3) we can solve to find the highest level of assets at which a household is constrained to not have any migrants:

$$\underline{A} = \frac{bN}{2} + I \tag{5}$$

This level is higher the higher is subsistence income I, and the more household members there are to reduce the marginal productivity of labor. Note that it does not depend on migration costs c, as subsistence concerns make these households unable to save anything in the first period, so that they can not migrate regardless of how low migration costs are.

Let us now see how the rate of migration changes with the level of wealth, A. From (2) we have:

$$\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial A} = -\frac{1}{bN} - \frac{c}{bN^2} \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial A} \tag{6}$$

and from (4) we have, when $\lambda \neq 0$,:

$$\frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial A} = -\frac{N}{c^2} \left(c + bN \right) \tag{7}$$

Substituting in (6) we have:

$$\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial A} = \begin{cases} -\frac{1}{bN} \text{ when } \lambda = 0\\ \frac{1}{c} \text{ when } \lambda > 0 \end{cases}$$
(8)

Interpreting (8), we see that when subsistence constraints bind, increasing wealth increases migration, the extent to which depends on migration costs c. When subsistence constraints no longer bind, an increase in wealth merely causes the opportunity cost of migrating to increase in terms of lost household production, and so households will reduce migration, the extent to which depends on productivity. Using (2) and (3) to find the level of level of A at which $m^* = \tilde{m}$, and hence at which $\lambda = 0$, gives a level of assets A_1 above which households are no longer bound by the subsistence constraint:

$$A_1 = \frac{1}{2} \frac{b^2 N^2 + 2bNI + 2bNc + 2cw - 2c^2}{c + bN}$$
(9)

Finally, we see in (8) that m^* is decreasing in A for $A > A_1$ ($\lambda = 0$). We can then find the lowest asset level at which unconstrained households will optimally choose no migration from (2) with $\lambda = 0$:

$$\overline{A} = bN + (w - c) \tag{10}$$

Note that this is increasing in the net benefit from migration, (w - c). So putting this altogether we have:

$$m^* = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ when } A \leq \underline{A} \\ \frac{1}{c} \left(A - \frac{bN}{2} - I \right) \text{ when } \underline{A} \leq A \leq A_1 \\ 1 - \frac{[A - (w - c)]}{bN} \text{ when } A_1 \leq A \leq \overline{A} \\ 0 \text{ when } A \geq \overline{A} \end{cases}$$
(11)

That is, a household's migration rate will be a triangular function of assets, with migration increasing with wealth at low levels, and decreasing with wealth at higher levels. In other words, as wealth increases, the maximal number of migrants a given household can afford increases but the optimal number decreases. Figure 1 shows this relationship.

This formalizes the two roles of wealth in Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) and shows that migration rates will first increase and then decrease with wealth. The model as presented does not incorporate risk. Migration itself is risky, and so decreasing absolute risk aversion will provide an additional reason for migration rates to increase with wealth. However, Stark (1982) and Stark and Levhari (1982) note that migration can provide a way for risk-averse farm households to diversify their income portfolio, which will be a more important rationale for migration for poorer households. Both these factors should act to reinforce the inverse-U shaped relationship between migration rates and initial wealth.

Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994) outline a cumulative theory of migration, which fits well with the assumptions of our model. They note that the first




Figure 1: Relationship between Migration Rate (m^*) and Asset Wealth (A).

migrants usually come from the lower middle ranges of the socioeconomic hierarchy, and are individuals who have enough resources to absorb the costs and risks of the trip, but are not so affluent that foreign labour is unattractive. Family and friends then draw on ties with these migrants to gain access to employment and assistance in migrating, substantially reducing the costs and risks of movement to them. This increases the attractiveness and feasibility of migration for additional members, allowing them to migrate and expanding further the set of people with network connections. Migration networks can then be viewed as reducing the cost of migration c, and perhaps also increasing the benefits w. Reducing the costs of migration has two effects on the desired level of household migration. Firstly, for a given unconstrained level of desired migration, a reduction in migration costs makes it less likely that subsistence concerns will prevent migration from reaching this desired level. This effect tends to reduce A_1 , the asset level at which households are no longer constrained. However, a reduction in migration costs also increases the net benefits of migrating, w - c, making households want to migrate more, and thereby increasing their likelihood of being constrained. This effect therefore tends to increase A_1 . One can show that which effect dominates depends on whether migration costs are high to begin with, in which case the second effect dominates, or low to begin with, in which case the first effect dominates. In terms of our notation,

$$\frac{\partial A_1}{\partial c} \stackrel{<}{=} 0 \Leftrightarrow c \stackrel{>}{=} -bN + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{(6b^2N^2 + 4(w-I)bN)}$$
(12)

Figure 2 plots the effect of a reduction in migration costs for initial situations of high and low costs. In both cases we see that networks, by lowering migration costs, increase desired household migration rates at any asset level at which there was initially some migration, and also induce additional individuals to migrate. Interestingly, these additional migrant households are household who were initially too wealthy to bother with migration given its costs, but who now find the net benefits of migration to have increased as a result of the network to a point where it is now worth migrating.




Figure 2: Effect of a Reduction in Migration Costs on Optimal Household Migration Rate According to Initial Level of Costs. Solid Lines are at original costs, Dotted Lines at the new lower costs.

As we are considering only one period for the migration decision, this rules out the possibility of strategic delay, whereby migrants delay migrating in the current period in order to wait for networks to lower the costs of migrating in the next. Even without such a factor, Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996) note that once networks make migration costs endogenous, there is the possibility of multiple equilibria, since individual households do not internalize the cost-lowering impact of their own migration on the migration decisions of others. In these circumstances, initial conditions become important, and a village which has high initial levels of migration for some exogenous reason will continue to have higher levels of migration in subsequent periods. We will use this idea to argue that historic migration rates provide instruments for current migration levels in the communities in our study.

In the context of this model, it becomes clear that the relationship between migration and subsequent inequality will depend on the initial distribution of income. In light of the observations of sociologists, such as Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994), it seems likely that initially it will be the middle class of a village whose who have the highest rates of migration, and so we can interpret the level of wealth A_1 , at which the initial turning point occurs, as being middle class. Their migration is then likely to increase village inequality. When migration costs are high to begin with, the first network effects tend to reinforce this, by increasing migration opportunities more for the middle and upper-middle classes, as is seen in the High Cost scenario in Figure 2. Migration will therefore increase inequality at first. However, as migration costs continue to fall through the building of a larger network, we see from the Low Cost scenario that further reductions in migration costs will benefit primarily the lower and lower-middle classes in the village, which will tend to reduce inequality. This gives rise to an inverted U-shaped relation between migration and inequality which is the hypothesis to be tested in this paper.

Migration also has additional distributional impacts which are not included in the above model. Migrants spend some of their remittances on products and services produced by non-migrant households, resulting in a multiplier effect of remittances. In addition, migration can have general equilibrium effects on wages in a community. Docquier and Rapoport (2003b) show that even when migration costs remain constant, the impact of emigration on rural labor markets can also result in an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration and inequality.

3 Data

Mexico has some of the most comprehensive surveys of migration available for any developing country. In order to examine the effect of migration on inequality in the sending communities, one would ideally like individual and communitylevel panel data on both assets and migration. While no single survey fits this criterion, we use two surveys which approach it: the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) data and the Encuesta Nacional de Dinámica Demográfica (ENADID), along with the national income and expenditure survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares - ENIGH).

The majority of our analysis uses data from the Mexican Migration Project, a collaborative research project based at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Guadalajara.⁶ The MMP surveyed five communities in 1982, between two and five communities each year from 1987-97, and fourteen communities in 1998. In general, 200 households were surveyed in each community, with smaller samples taken in communities with less than 500 residents. We use the MMP71 database, which contains data on 71 communities. Since our theoretical model applies best to rural communities and small towns, we restrict most of our analysis to the 57 communities which had a population below 100,000 in 1990. Each community is surveyed only once, but household heads are asked entire life retrospective migration histories, including whether at each point in time they had a parent or sibling with U.S. migrant experience.⁷ In addition, the survey asks for each individual in the household whether they have ever been to the United States, and if so, in what year was their first migrant experience. This enables the construction of a time-series of the stock of current residents in a community who had migrant experience in a given year. In addition to questions about migration, households are asked about their current and past land holdings, and about current household infrastructure and durable

 $^{^6{\}rm Full}$ details of the methodology, the data, and the question naires are available at http://www.pop.upenn.edu/mexmig.

 $^{^{7}}$ Later years of the survey also ask this information for spouses of the head, but since this data is not available for all communities, we do not use it in our analysis.

asset ownership. No information is collected on household income or consumption in Mexico. The dataset also contains community-level variables taken from past years of the Mexican Census. The survey is typically taken in December and January, which is when traditionally most migrants return to their communities, but if initial fieldwork suggests migrants tend to return during other months instead, a portion of the interviews are conducted then.⁸

The MMP surveys have the advantage of containing the most detailed migration data, allowing construction of both community and household head panel data on migration and migration networks. However, since data on assets is collected only for the survey year, we only have cross-sectional data on inequality for each community. Moreover, although migration history itself is not an explicit criteria in selection of communities, the survey contains data from only 13 of Mexico's 32 states, with many of the surveyed communities coming from the traditional migrant-sending states in West-Central Mexico. For these reasons we also carry out some estimation using data from the ENADID⁹. The ENADID is a national demographic survey intended to provide information on fertility, infant and general mortality, national and international migration, births, deaths and contraceptive practices. It was taken in 1992 and again in 1997 by Mexico's national statistical agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). The questionnaires and summary tables for 1992 are contained in INEGI (1994). Approximately 2000 households were surveyed in each state, with a total sample size of 57,017 households in 1992 and 73,412 households in 1997. The ENADID asks whether household members have ever been to the U.S. in search of work. This question is asked of all household members who normally live in the household, even if they are temporarily studying or working elsewhere, and an additional question asks whether any household members have gone to live in another country in the past five years. Thus U.S. migrants are recorded as long as they return to Mexico or have family members remaining in the community. Although the same households were not sampled in both years, some of the same municipalities were. Restricting our focus to municipalities with less than 100,000 population, we were able to match 97 municipalities in which 50 or more households were surveyed in both 1992 and 1997, although in only 33 of these were 100 or more households surveyed in both years. As with the MMP data, the ENADID surveys collect some information on household infrastructure, but no data on consumption and only the 1997 survey contains income data. In the next Section we describe the method used to calculate inequality based on such data. For the municipalities which are surveyed in both 1992 and 1997, we then have a short panel on inequality and migration at the community level.

The MMP survey collects migration information for all children of the household, whether or not they live at the home. In addition, since the surveys are collected during the traditional migrant return period, data is collected on com-

⁸A small non-random sample of 10-20 households from each community is also conducted in the U.S., however we do not use this data.

 $^{^9\}mathrm{See}$ Massey and Zenteno (2000) for a comparison of the MMP with the ENADID 1992 survey.

munity members who are only present for part of the year in Mexico. Households for which all community members have permanently migrated to the United States are not captured. We therefore study the impact of migration of community members who have returned to the community, or who have parents still in the community, on inequality among households present in the community at the time of the survey. Since Mexican migration is characterized by frequent return, with the median trip duration in the MMP and ENADID being seven months (Massey and Zenteno, 2000), this still enables us to capture much of the community's migration experience.

More detailed description of the asset variables contained in the MMP and ENADID surveys and the method used to construct inequality measures from them is contained in the next Section, while precise definitions of the migration variables are deferred to Section 6. A Data Appendix describes the source and construction of variables not contained directly in these data sets. Table 1 provides summary statistics for both the MMP and ENADID surveys for key variables used in this paper. As expected, the MMP sample consists of communities with higher average levels of migration than the ENADID sample: on average 26 percent of individuals aged 15 and over in the MMP communities had been to the U.S., compared to 9 percent in the ENADID municipalities.

4 Construction of Consumption and Inequality Measures

The MMP data and the ENADID data provide the most comprehensive information about Mexican migration. However, unfortunately neither survey contains information on consumption, while only the ENADID 1997 survey has income data. The surveys do contain a variety of information on household infrastructure; such as whether the house has a dirt or tile floor and whether the household has access to running water, electricity and sewerage facilities; and the MMP survey also asks whether households own certain durable assets, such as a car, radio, television, stove and fridge. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) have argued that the first principal component based on such asset indicators can provide reasonable estimates of wealth *level* effects. In a companion paper, McKenzie (2003) uses the ENIGH surveys from Mexico, which contain data on both asset indicators and consumption and income, to show how such asset indicators can be used to also obtain proxies for inequalities in living standards. We briefly summarize this approach here and its use in constructing measures of inequality for the MMP and ENADID surveyed communities.

Given a vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, ..., x_P)'$ of asset indicators, most of which are dummy variables for types of infrastructure or ownership of certain durables, the first principal component of the observations, y, is the linear combination

$$y = a_1 \left(\frac{x_1 - \overline{x}_1}{s_1}\right) + a_2 \left(\frac{x_2 - \overline{x}_2}{s_2}\right) + \dots + a_p \left(\frac{x_p - \overline{x}_p}{s_p}\right)$$
(13)

whose sample variance is greatest amongst all such linear combinations, subject to the restriction a'a = 1, where \overline{x}_k and s_k are the sample mean and standard deviation of variable x_k . Assets which vary most across households are given larger weight, which is a useful feature of this approach for measuring inequality. Since the mean of y across all households is zero, inequality measures which divide by the mean are ill-defined. Instead, McKenzie (2003) proposes a relative measure of inequality across communities. Letting σ_c be the standard deviation of y across households in community c, and ϕ be the standard deviation of yover the whole sample, a measure of relative inequality is then:

$$I_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\phi} \tag{14}$$

 I_c can be shown to satisfy many of the commonly accepted desired properties of an inequality measure, and can be thought of as a proxy for relative inequality in wealth. The key requirement for this type of index to be a good proxy for wealth inequality across communities is that there is a sufficiently broad class of asset indicators collected so as to allow for differentiation in living standards across households. Graphing the probability density function of the asset index enables one to see if the distribution is clumped into a small number of groups or truncated at one end.

Table 2 provides a summary of the scoring factors a, and the different asset indicators available for use in the MMP and ENADID surveys, for which data also exists in the ENIGH surveys. The MMP survey contains a much broader range of indicators than the ENADID, with yes/no questions on ownership of household durables such as a car, radio, and fridge, as well as data on household infrastructure and building materials. The first principal component appears to be measuring wealth, and is internally consistent in the sense that mean ownership of each asset is increasing across terciles, while poor materials such as dirt floors and water piped outside of the house, are decreasing with the overall asset index. Figure 3 plots the probability density function of the asset index for each of the two surveys. The MMP density is smooth, with no signs of clumping, and does not have truncated tails, suggesting that the relative inequality measure based on this index will perform well. In contrast, the smaller number of indicators available for the ENADID survey results in some clumping of the asset index values. In addition, there do not seem to be sufficient indicators to fully distinguish among the top households, leading to truncation of the top tail. The relative inequality measure, I_c , is therefore less likely to be a satisfactory measure of inequality for the ENADID.

While I_c can be used to obtain a measure of inequality in wealth using the MMP or ENADID survey alone, we would also like to consider the effect of migration on inequalities in income and consumption. The ENIGH surveys contain data on income, consumption, and many of the same asset indicators as are in the migration surveys. These surveys were taken in 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998. For the MMP surveys, we use the closest ENIGH survey to the survey year to predict inequality, while the 1992 and 1998 ENIGH surveys are used to predict inequality for the 1992 and 1997 ENADID surveys respectively. Con-




Figure 3: Density Function of Asset Index constructed from MMP and ENADID samples

sumption and Income were converted into real 1998 pesos using the consumer price index provided by the Bank of Mexico. With these auxiliary surveys we use the bootstrap prediction method of McKenzie (2003) to obtain predicted inequality in consumption and income. We outline the method for the MMP data, noting where differences arise when using the ENADID. The first step is to use the ENIGH survey to regress log of non-durable consumption (lndc) on the vector of asset indicators x and a vector of household demographic controls w:

$$\ln ndc_i = \beta' x_i + \gamma' w_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{15}$$

This equation is carried out only for households in the same states as are in the MMP data (and using all states for the ENADID), and only for households in communities of less than 100,000 population. The residuals from this regression $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$, are then divided into two groups, according to whether they correspond to a principal component above or below the median. Then using the MMP data, for household j in group g, we draw (with replacement) an $\tilde{\varepsilon}_j$ from the empirical distribution of residuals for households in group g, and use this to obtain the predicted non-durable consumption for household j:

$$\widetilde{ndc_j} = \exp\left(\widehat{\beta}' x_j + \widehat{\gamma}' w_j + \widetilde{\varepsilon}_j\right)$$
(16)

The Gini coefficient of predicted non-durable consumption is then calculated for each MMP or ENADID community. This procedure is repeated 20 times and we take the mean Gini over all replications. Likewise, one can replace non-durable consumption with household income and repeat the process.

Using this procedure, McKenzie (2003) finds a rank-order correlation of 0.85 between actual and predicted state-level Ginis of non-durable consumption in Mexico, suggesting that this method provides an appropriate measure of inequality. Since the bootstrapping process samples from the residuals of actual consumption, the clumping and truncation problems which affect measurement of relative asset inequality for the ENADID will not be such a concern for the predicted gini of NDC. The 1997 ENADID does in fact collect information on total household income, so as an additional check we compare the income Ginis calculated from the income questions in the ENADID to those predicted using the bootstrap procedure, and find a correlation of 0.518. Given that the ENADID and ENIGH surveys ask different questions to collect income, we consider this correlation satisfactory, and proceed using the bootstrapped predicted Ginis, which are available for all surveys and years.

5 Determinants of Migration

The theoretical model presented in Section 2 predicts that migration rates will display a non-linear relationship with wealth. Since our analysis of the effect of migration on inequality is predicated on such a relationship between migration and household resources, we first examine the empirical support for such a model. Massey and Espinosa (1997) study a large number of determinants of the migration decision, and find social capital in the form of migrant parents, siblings, and other community members to play the most powerful role. However, they include only dummy variables for land, home, and business ownership, and thus do not examine the role of nonlinearities in wealth.

Using the MMP data for municipalities with less than 100,000 population in 1990, we estimate a probit model for the probability of a household head in Mexico migrating to the United States at some stage in the three years prior to the survey year as a quadratic function of household resources. Four different measures of household resources are used: actual land holdings, the asset index based on the first principal component, and predicted monetary non-durable consumption and predicted income calculated for each household by the method discussed in Section 4. The relationship is estimated separately for different five-year age ranges of the household head.

Figure 4 shows that the empirical relationship between migration rates and household resources is indeed first increasing and then decreasing in total resources. The highest migration rate is found at levels of resources at or just above the median level for households with heads aged 20-39. This complements the finding of Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) that Mexican immigrants tend to come from the upper-middle of the education distribution in Mexico. At low levels of wealth we see that younger household heads are more likely to migrate, whereas there is much less difference between age groups in migration rates at higher levels of consumption, income or asset levels. In terms of the theoretical model above, this suggests that the costs and benefits of migration do not differ greatly across age groups, but that younger heads are less constrained. The subsistence level of income I in the model should therefore be lower for younger heads. This seems plausible if older heads are more likely to have children and spouses which increase total subsistence needs.

Table 3 examines further the determinants of the migration decision of the




Figure 4: Relationship between Wealth and Migration Rate of the Household Head. Vertical lines indicate 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles.

household head, and the role of personal and community migration networks in this decision. We use predicted log non-durable consumption (lndc) as our preferred measure of household resources. We begin with a cross-sectional analysis, estimating a probit model of the probability that a male household head aged 15-49 years made a trip to the United States within three years of the survey year. Column 1 replicates the unconditional quadratic relationship between migration rates and *lndc*. Column 2 finds that this relationship continues to hold after controlling for the age, education, marital and parental status of the household head, and for various community characteristics which might be thought to affect access to credit, access to information about migration opportunities, and the cost of migrating, such as availability of lenders, whether there is a train station in the community, distance to the nearest highway and distance to the principal migrant destination for community in the U.S. None of these community characteristics is found to play a significant role, while heads with more education are found less likely to migrate, conditional on other characteristics. Column 3 then introduces the U.S. migration rate for 1924 for the state in which each community is located, taken from Foerster (1925).¹⁰ This historic state-level migration rate is found to have a strongly significant positive effect on an individual head's probability of migration.

Column 4 of Table 3 then adds the head's own previous migration experience, and measures of the migration experience of the immediate family and community of the head. Heads which have previously migrated are more likely

¹⁰Thanks to Chris Woodruff for generously supplying this data.

to migrate again. In terms of the migration experience of one's family network, having a brother with migrant experience raises the probability of the head's migration by 0.03 at the mean, while the migrant experience of the head's parents and sister(s) is not found to have a significant effect. The community network is also found to matter, with the proportion of households with migrant experience 20 years prior to the survey year having a significant positive effect. Once we control for the community and personal network, the 1924 state migration rate does not have a separate effect. Figure 4 suggests that the effect of household head, and one may also have reason to believe that the effect of the community network also varies with age. Column 5 includes these interactions, and finds a negative interaction between *lndc* and age of the head, so that an increase in *lndc* results in a smaller increase in migration rates at lower wealth levels for older heads, as was seen in Figure 4. The effect of the community network 20 years ago is found to be slightly higher for older heads.

The community characteristics included aim to capture differences amongst communities which could affect migration. However, there may still be unobserved community characteristics which affect the probability that all individuals in a community migrate. The personal and community migrant network variables could then be capturing the influence of these unobservable characteristics, rather than the role of networks. Column 6 of Table 3 includes community fixed effects to capture time-invariant community characteristics. We still find a strong quadratic relation between migration rates and *lndc*, and own migration experience to be important. Having a brother with migrant experience has a positive effect at the 10 percent significance level and the interaction between age of the head and community migration rates 20 years earlier is still significant, showing a role for networks even after controlling for community fixed effects.

The migration decision is also affected by the benefits of migrating to the U.S. Prime determinants of these benefits are the wage gap between Mexico and the United States, and the probability of finding employment in the U.S. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) find a negative relation between Mexican real wages and border apprehensions, a weaker positive effect of U.S. wages on apprehensions, but no significant effect of U.S. unemployment on border apprehensions. We define the wage gap as the difference between the real U.S. hourly manufacturing wage expressed in terms of pesos and the real hourly Mexican manufacturing wage¹¹. We then regress the percentage change in the wage gap between years t and t+1 on the real depreciation over the year, using annual data from 1969-1998. The \mathbb{R}^2 for this regression is 0.959, with a coefficient of 2.10 on the real depreciation. Movements in the Mexico-U.S. real exchange rate therefore appear to be the major source of movements in relative wages between the two countries. Since real exchange rate data is available over a longer period than real wages, we use the real depreciation as our main measure of relative wage changes.

¹¹Wage data kindly provided by Gordon Hanson.

Since different communities are sampled in different survey years, including these aggregate time-varying variables in the cross-sectional analysis will confound community differences with time variation in the real depreciation and unemployment rates. Columns 7 to 10 of Table 3 therefore use retrospective life migration histories for the household head from the MMP surveys. Panel data is available for characteristics of the head and for the head's personal and community migrant network. However, predicted log non-durable consumption is only available for the survey year, so the assumption implicit here is that *lndc* is fixed over time. Column 7 replicates Column 5 with the panel migration data, finding qualitatively similar results. Column 8 then adds the time-varying aggregate variables, and finds a significant negative effect of the real depreciation rate on the probability of migration. This negative effect of a devaluation is also found by Massey and Espinosa (1997) who note that while a real depreciation increases the wage gap between Mexico and the United States, it also raises the cost of being smuggled into the U.S., which is usually expressed in terms of dollars. The negative effect suggests that the effect of the real depreciation on costs dominates its effect on the benefits, and that credit constraints do matter.

Column 9 includes community fixed effects, so that one is able to see the effect of changes within communities over time. After controlling for these community fixed effects, one still finds a significant positive effect of networks. The family network of the head matters. Having a brother with migrant experience increases the probability at the mean that a head migrates by 0.017, while having a migrant father or sister also has a smaller, but still significant effect. This effect is after conditioning on lndc, so is not simply capturing a wealth effect of migration by other family members. Moreover, the community migrant network also matters, with heads being more likely to migrate the more other household heads migrated in the previous period. Column 10 of Table 3 drops lndc, since it is only measured in the survey year. Education of the head now shows a much stronger and quadratic effect, which is not surprising given the correlation of 0.56 between education and lndc. Both family and community networks continue to be important.

Table 4 carries out further robustness checks on Table 3. The relationship between migration and *lndc* was found to be quadratic in Table 3, with a negative interaction between age of the head and *lndc*. Table 4 shows that a cubic term is insignificant, as are interaction terms between *lndc*² and the age of the head, and between *lndc* and state, community, and own migration experience.¹² The effect of the network therefore appears to not be strongly related to the level of household resources.¹³ Further interactions between age, education and migrant experience are also not significant. A real depreciation was found to have a negative effect on the probability of migration, which was explained in

 $^{^{12}}$ The interaction between own migrant experience and lndc is significant in Column 9, but interpretation is clouded by the likely endogeneity of lndc in this specification.

¹³Note that in the probit estimation, the effect of these network variables on the probability of migration already does vary with the levels of the other variables in the model, so it is not the case, for example, that having a migrant brother will raise the probability of migration for all household heads by the same amount.

terms of its effect on the cost of migration. If this is the case, one should expect households with more resources to be affected less by this increase in cost. Table 4 shows the interaction between real depreciation and *lndc* to be positive, so that the point estimate supports this hypothesis, although the interaction is not statistically significant.

6 Inequality and Migration

6.1 Direct and Indirect effects of migration

The most direct effect of migration is to increase the welfare of the migrant households, as migrants bring back remittances and savings from abroad. This can either increase or decrease inequality in the community, depending on where the migrant household is located in the overall community wealth distribution. However, in addition to these effects on the migrant's own household, it has been argued that there can be spillover benefits for the community at large. One such effect is through the multiplier role of remittances. Durand, Parrado and Massey (1996) report that the majority of U.S. earnings are spent on current consumption, including family maintenance, health, home construction and the purchase of consumer goods. Such spending increases the demand for goods and services produced by other community members. Adelman, Taylor and Vogel (1988) use a Social Accounting Matrix to estimate that a \$100 drop in remittances results in a \$178 drop in village income, for one village in Michoacán. Remittances also help foster production, with Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) finding a strong effect of remittances on investment in microenterprises.

The community can also benefit further from migration through migrant funding of public goods, and through the formation of networks, which lower the costs and increase the potential benefits to other community members from migrating. Table 5 uses data from the Mexican Migration Project to present supportive evidence of this. We divide communities into those above the median migration prevalence rate and to those below. The top panel of Table 5 then looks at the proportion of communities in these two groups for which migrants had contributed to funding of local infrastructure. Communities with a higher migrant prevalence are found to be more likely to have local public goods financed by migrants, with churches, the community plaza, and electricity supply being significantly more likely.

The bottom panel of Table 5 looks at the role of networks in helping migrants obtain jobs in the United States. Migrants from communities where more other community members have migrated are significantly more likely to have obtained their last U.S. job through the recommendation of a relative, friend, or fellow community member, rather than through their own search or contracting. Even in communities with lower levels of overall prevalence, household heads who actually migrate still rely heavily on relatives or friends to recommend them for a job, however with low prevalence, less people will know relatives or friends in the U.S. who can help them in this way. Moreover, Munshi (2003) finds that individuals with larger networks are not only more likely to be employed, but are also more likely to hold a higher paying nonagricultural job in the U.S. In addition to raising the expected benefits of migration, networks can also reduce the cost of migrating. For example, Durand et al. (1996) report that migradollars have played a large role in promoting transportation to the border.

Additionally, migration can have general equilibrium effects which affect other community members. Mishra (2003) finds that Mexican migration to the U.S. has a significant positive impact of the wages of other workers in Mexico. However, these effects are estimated to be greatest for higher wage workers, and therefore increase wage inequality in Mexico. However, Hanson, Robertson and Spilimbergo (2002) find a weaker effect of border enforcement on wages in Mexican border cities, with the effect greatest for low-education workers. The overall effect of migration on inequality, which we attempt to measure in the next Section, is therefore the net result of these direct effects, multiplier effects, network effects, and general equilibrium effects.

6.2 OLS Results

The prediction of our theoretical model is that, conditional on other community characteristics, inequality should first increase and then decrease with the level of community migration experience. To avoid issues of simultaneity, we therefore model current inequality for community i in survey year t, $Ineq_{i,t}$, as a quadratic function of previous migration, $mig_{i,t-s}$, and a vector of other current community characteristics, $X_{i,t}$:

$$Ineq_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 mig_{i,t-s} + \beta_2 mig_{i,t-s}^2 + \gamma' X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$(17)$$

Our main measure of migration is the community migration prevalence ratio 15 years before the survey period. The migration prevalence ratio is defined as in Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994) to be the number of people in a given community aged 15 years or older with international migratory experience in a given year divided by the total number of people in the community aged 15 or older alive in the reference year. They argue that such an indicator provides a good proxy for the extent of a given community's involvement in the transnational migratory process. Moreover, in the present context, the prevalence ratio serves as a measure of the stock of migration experience in the community, which is expected to impact on inequality through both the direct and indirect channels mentioned above. For robustness, we will later consider a second measure of migration experience, which is the proportion of current households which had a migrant 15 years before. Since we are concerned that there may be factors which contemporaneously affect both migration and inequality, such as temporary shocks at the community level, we look at migration experience 15 years prior to the survey period, although later consider also periods of 5, 10 and 20 years before for robustness purposes. Since the MMP survey asks all individuals the year of their first trip to the U.S., these measures of migration prevalence can be easily calculated at any point in time. In contrast, the ENADID survey only asks as of the survey date whether individuals have ever been to the U.S. and the year of the last trip, which means that one can not calculate historic migration prevalence rates for the ENADID communities.

Three separate measures of inequality are considered: the predicted Gini of non-durable consumption obtained via the method outlined in Section 4, the predicted Gini of income obtained via the same method, and the relative inequality in assets measure, I_c , given in equation 14. The MMP71 dataset then contains information on 57 communities with 1990 populations below 100,000. Given this relatively small sample size, we choose a parsimonious specification of the other community characteristics $X_{i,t}$, including the proportion of household heads aged under 30 in the survey year, the proportion of household heads aged over 60, the proportion of household heads with less than six years of education, and the proportion of household heads with nine or more years of education.

Table 6 then presents the OLS estimates of equation 17. We present specifications which include only a linear term in past migration experience, as well as those which also contain a quadratic term, and specifications both with and without the community characteristics as additional regressors. With all three measures of inequality, the overall fit is poor when the demographic controls are not included, and one does not find a statistically significant relationship between past migration stock and current inequality. Including the demographic controls improves the fit somewhat, and there is a significant negative relationship between migration prevalence and inequality in assets, and inequality in income. The coefficient on migration prevalence is negative, but insignificant, in the equation for inequality in non-durable consumption.

6.3 IV Results

The OLS regressions contain only limited controls for community characteristics, and so a concern is that there are unobserved community characteristics which are correlated with both past migration prevalence and current inequality. Possible examples would include employment opportunities within the community, access to credit, and land ownership patterns. While we have proxies for some of these characteristics, such as data on the number of banks in the community, such proxies are likely to be imperfect. Furthermore, with only 57 communities, the model would soon become saturated should we attempt to control for all community characteristics which are plausibly related to both migration and inequality. Therefore we instead pursue an instrumental variables strategy to account for a possible omitted variables bias due to correlation between $mig_{i,t-s}$ and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$.

We consider several possible instruments for the migration prevalence in a community. Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) argue that historic state-level migration flows can be used as instruments for current migration in estimating the effect of migration remittances on microenterprise capital. Following them, we use the U.S. migration rate for 1924 for the state in which each community is located, taken from Foerster (1925), which was found to have a significant effect

on the individual migration decision in Section 5. These state-level historic migration rates may be argued to be a result of largely historic demand-side factors coupled with the arrival of railroads into Mexico. Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) outline how restrictions on immigration from Asia coupled with a booming economy in the Southwest of the United States lead US employers to hire "enganchadores" to obtain as many workers as possible. These enganchadores followed the railroads south into Mexico, stopping in the first sizeable population centers they encountered to hire workers, which were in the west-central Mexican states. The arrival and lay-out of the railroad system thereby led to some states having different migration rates than others. This historic migration at the state level led to the development of migration networks, which we expect to determine the community-level migration prevalence, $mig_{i,t-s}$, but not otherwise affect inequality within the community. Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994, p 1496) lead credence to this assumption, arguing that "transnational migration tends to become a self-reinforcing process that...over time...becomes increasingly independent of the conditions that originally caused it".¹⁴

In addition to the 1924 state migration rates, Woodruff and Zenteno also use migration rates over the 1955-59 period by state, taken from González Navarro (1974).¹⁵ These rates are from the peak period of the 1942-64 bracero program. This program allowed for the legal entry of temporary farm workers, providing up to 450,000 work visas annually to Mexicans during the peak years, and allowed for the immigration of around 5 million Mexicans into the United States (Massey, Durand and Malone (2002)). The sharp break in U.S. immigration policy in 1965 ended this program, and undocumented migration came to greatly outnumber legal migration in the subsequent period. State-level migration rates during this bracero period are expected to contribute to community prevalence rates, both directly through some community members participating in the bracero program, and through the development of migrant networks. However, they are not expected to have an additional impact on current community levels of inequality, especially given the period of thirty to forty years which have passed since the peak years of the bracero period.

A second set of instruments consists of demand-side variables from the United States, which affect the costs and benefits of migrating, but have no other direct impact on rural Mexican communities. For each MMP community, one can identify the most common US city destination for migrants from a given community on their first trip to the U.S. Differences in geographic proximity and historic migration patterns will mean that different communities will tend to cluster at different US destinations. The unemployment rate in the US state in which this destination city is located will then affect migration from that community to the US. Since we need to instrument migration stocks rather than flows, we aggregate up unemployment in each of the ten years prior to the year in which migration prevalence is measured, and weight by the proportion of current household heads who were of prime migrant age, 20-30 years, in

¹⁴Escobar Latapí et al. (1998, p 164) also conclude that "the origins of Mexico-U.S. migration lie largely inside the United States".

¹⁵Data kindly supplied by Chris Woodruff.

that year. For example, for community 1 surveyed in 1987, for which the most common U.S. destination is Los Angeles, the weighted unemployment rate is then calculated as the 1971 Californian unemployment rate (cue_{71}) multiplied by the proportion of heads in that community aged 20-30 years in 1971 (f_{71}) $+ cue_{70}f_{70} + ... + cue_{62}f_{62}$. This weighted unemployment over 1962-71 is then used to instrument migration prevalence in community 1 in 1972. Similarly, we also use the real depreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar, weighted by prime age population in each of the fifteen years prior to the year at which migration prevalence is measured as an instrument. Different communities are surveyed in different years, and have different cohort sizes of prime migration age in the years in which large depreciations are realized, resulting in differences in the effective depreciation faced by our different communities. Finally, we also consider the distance from the community to the prime U.S. destination, and this distance squared as possible instruments for migration prevalence.

We note that the instrumentation strategy used by Munshi (2003), which uses rainfall in Mexican communities as an instrument for the size of the network, is inappropriate in our context. Munshi examines the effect of migration on outcomes in the U.S., and hence wants an instrument which determines the size of the migration network but which is uncorrelated with U.S. labour market conditions. In contrast, since our focus is on the sending communities themselves, rainfall in these communities is likely to affect both migration and inequality, and thus does not serve as a valid instrument, whereas U.S. labour market conditions are appropriate instruments in our application.

Table 7 then presents the first-stage instrumental variables regression results when various combinations of these instruments are used to instrument migration prevalence and migration prevalence squared. Results are presented both for the cases with and without community demographic characteristics included as exogenous regressors in the second-stage. Three main instrument sets are used. Set A is arguably the most exogenous, consisting of the 1924 state level migration rate, and the US state unemployment rate and weighted real depreciation. Instrument Set B consists of solely the 1955-59 rate, which has the single greatest predictive power, and is therefore least subject to weak instrument concerns, while Instrument Set C consists of the full set of possible instruments. Both the 1924 and 1955-59 state migration rates are found to be significant, when included separately, with the 1955-59 rate maintaining significance when both sets are included. Weighted state unemployment generally has the expected negative sign, but is insignificant. The weighted real depreciation has a negative coefficient, which is significant in some specifications. As in estimation of the individual household head's migration decision, it therefore appears that a real depreciation reduces migration, possibly through an increase in the cost of migrating. Migration prevalence at first increases and then decreases with distance, which we attribute to picking up the fact that most migration still comes from west-central Mexico. The p-values for the F-statistic of the excluded instruments are all less than 0.01 for the prediction of community migration prevalence, while the F-statistics themselves are around 5 for instrument sets A and C, and over 30 for instrument set B. Migration prevalence squared is predicted somewhat less strongly than the level of migration prevalence, but the F-statistics still show instrument relevance.

The second-stage IV results using the Gini of non-durable consumption as our inequality measure are given in Table 8. Table 9 provides results using relative asset inequality, while Table 10 gives the results using the income Gini. In each table, columns (1)-(3) present results for a linear specification in migration prevalence with no additional regressors, columns (4)-(6) add community demographic characteristics, and columns (7)-(12) add a quadratic term in migration prevalence to columns (1)-(6). Comparing the IV estimates to the OLS estimates in Table 6, we find the coefficients in columns (4)-(6) of Tables 8-10 to be more negative, and of greater significance, than the corresponding OLS regressions in columns (3), (7) and (11) of Table 6. After instrumenting and controlling for community characteristics, migration prevalence has a significant negative effect on community inequality. This effect is strongest and most significant for asset inequality, where the coefficients in columns (5) and (6) of Table 9 translate an increase in past migration prevalence of 0.14, representing the interquartile range of migration prevalence, into a -0.17 reduction in the asset inequality index. This represents a 20 percent reduction at the mean relative asset inequality index, and would take a community at the 75th percentile of asset inequality down almost to the 25th percentile. The same magnitude increase in migration prevalence is predicted to reduce the income Gini by 0.022to 0.025, and the non-durable consumption Gini by 0.015 to 0.018. At the mean this translates into a 4.4 percent fall in the Gini of NDC and a 5.6 percent fall in the income Gini, taking a community at the 75th percentile of inequality down to the median, so these effects of migration are lower for income and consumption inequality than for asset inequality. For both instrument sets A and C, the overidentification test p-values are larger than 0.12 for all the specifications which are linear in migration prevalence, so we cannot reject that our instruments are valid.

Adding a quadratic term in migration prevalence to the instrument variables regression results in insignificant coefficients on most of the quadratic terms, which accords with the OLS results. The signs of the coefficients in columns (7)-(9) of Tables 8 and 9 are in accordance with our theoretical prediction, with inequality first increasing and then decreasing with migration, however the coefficients are not significant. Once we include community characteristics, both the linear and quadratic terms in migration prevalence are negative in the equations for non-durable consumption and income. That is, we find no significant evidence for nonlinearity in the inequality and migration relationship using the MMP data.

The results thusfar indicate a significant negative relationship between migration prevalence ratios 15 years before the survey and current inequality. Table 11 examines the robustness of this relationship to alternative time lags, looking at the instrumented migration prevalence 5, 10, and 20 years before the survey period. Since inequality is measured between households, the proportion of households with a migrant member may also be a more appropriate measure of community levels of migration, and so we also consider this proportion 5, 10, and 15 years before the survey period. We continue to find a significantly negative relationship between inequality and past migration, for all three measures of inequality and each of these alternative measures of past community migration experience. Our findings are therefore robust to alternative measures of timing.

6.4 ENADID Results : Does a Change in Inequality result from a Change in Migration?

Using the MMP data we find that an increase in migration prevalence is followed by a reduction in inequality, but no evidence for increases in inequality at lower levels of migration prevalence. As mentioned previously, the MMP communities are mostly from states with historically high levels of migration, and it may be that most of the MMP communities are therefore past the level of migration at which a turning point occurs. For this reason, we use the ENADID surveys, which are nationally representative and cover a wider range of migration experiences. We are able to match some of the same municipalities in the 1992 and 1997 ENADID surveys, and then examine changes in inequality over a period in the 1990s in which substantial migration to the U.S. from Mexico was occurring. We then run the following regression across municipalities k:

$$\Delta Ineq_k = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \Delta mig_k + \delta_2 \Delta mig_k * mig_{k,1992} + u_k \tag{18}$$

where $\Delta Ineq_k$ denotes the change in inequality in municipality k between 1992 and 1997, Δmig_k is the change in migration prevalence over this same period, and $mig_{k,1992}$ is the 1992 level of migration prevalence. If an increase in migration always results in a reduction in inequality, then we would expect $\delta_1 < 0$. The interaction term allows for the effect of the change in migration to vary according to the initial level. If the theory is correct and there is in fact an inverse U-shape, then one would expect to find $\delta_1 > 0$ and $\delta_2 < 0$, that is, an increase in migration would increase inequality at low initial levels of migration stock, and would reduce inequality at higher levels. The constant term captures any aggregate change in within-municipality inequality occurring in Mexico between 1992 and 1997.

Since equation 18 is expressed in terms of differences, municipality fixed characteristics which are correlated with both inequality and migration levels are differenced out. This greatly reduces the need for instrumenting, and we run equation 18 using OLS. We are unable to employ the instrumental variables approach used for the MMP data, since distances to the border and historic migration rates are fixed over time, while changes in U.S. labour market conditions prove to be weak instruments for explaining variation across communities in migration rates over this period.

One concern is that since we observe a different sample of individuals from a given municipality in 1997 than we did in 1992, some of the changes in inequality and migration prevalence found in the data may just be the result of small-sample measurement-error bias. With sufficient individuals sampled from a

municipality, this is less of a concern. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) find that with sample sizes of 100-200 households, pseudo-panel data provides a good approximation to genuine panel data. We therefore carry out our analysis both using the full sample of 97 municipalities with 50 or more observations that could be matched in both ENADID surveys, and also using the 33 municipalities which had a sample size of 100 or more households in both surveys.

Table 12 presents the results of estimating equation 18 with the ENADID data. Using the full sample of 97 municipalities, one finds insignificant coefficients. This is to be expected if measurement error is introducing additional variability to the data. Using the reduced sample of 33 municipalities, one finds in column 2 no significant relationship when the interaction term is not included, and a significant inverse-U relationship once the interaction term is included in column 4. The Gini of non-durable consumption increases with an increase in migration up to an initial migration prevalence ratio of 0.17, after which it decreases. The turning point lies within the observed sample range, at around the 85th percentile of 1992 migration prevalence in the ENADID survey, but only at the 34th percentile of current migration prevalence in the MMP surveys. In columns 5 and 6 we see this inverse U-shape relationship is robust to the use of an alternative measure of migration stock, and to using median regression instead of OLS to estimate equation 18. When we use the I_c measure of relative inequality, we find no significant effect using the migration prevalence ratio, and a very weak effect using the proportion of households with a migrant. This may be a result of the clumping and truncation seen in Figure 2, which we argued meant that asset inequality was likely to be measured less well than consumption inequality in the ENADID data. Columns 9 and 10 find some evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship for income, but not as strong as for non-durable consumption.

The evidence for an inverse U-shape should be viewed as suggestive only, since the relationship is not significant in the full ENADID dataset, possibly due to measurement error, and is stronger for non-durable consumption than for asset or income inequality. The nature of the data means that we can not employ instrumental variables here, and so only claim an association between changes in migration and changes in inequality. Although there may be unobserved time-varying community characteristics which effect both changes in migration and changes in inequality, it is difficult to think of a priori reasons why they should result in the inverse U-shaped inequality-migration relationship found here. The results can be squared with the findings of the MMP data, in which migration resulted in a decrease in inequality, by noting that the majority of the MMP communities have migration prevalence higher than the turning point predicted in the ENADID data, so that one observes only the second part of the inverse-U in the MMP data.

7 Conclusions

Migrants to the United States from Mexico are found to come from the middle of the asset wealth distribution, with the probability of migration displaying an inverse-U shaped relationship with wealth. The presence of migration networks, both at the family and at the community level, are found to increase the likelihood of migration, which accords with their ability to raise expected benefits and lower costs of migration. At high levels of migration prevalence, such as occur in many of the MMP communities, we find that this migration leads to a reduction in inequality. Large networks spread the benefits of migration to other members of the community, reducing inequality. Asset inequality is found to decline more than consumption or income inequality. We find suggestive evidence for a Kuznet's relationship using data from the ENADID, with migration increasing inequality at lower levels of migration stock, and then reducing inequality as one approaches the migration levels prevailing in the MMP communities. Panel data on inequality over longer time periods, and for more communities, is needed to confirm this evidence.

8 Data Appendix

U.S. State Level Unemployment Rates: The official State-level unemployment rates available from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics begin in 1970. Unemployment data from 1962-1974 was obtained from "Area Trends in Employment and Unemployment", U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Bureau of Employment Security, monthly reports. Data on the insured unemployment rate as a percentage of covered employment was obtained for 1954-69 from "Unemployment Insurance Claims", Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, weekly reports, and was taken at the end of the first week in September each year. This data was used to extrapolate back the state-level unemployment rate using the formula predicted state unemployment in year tequals insured unemployment rate in year t multiplied by the 1962 actual state unemployment rate divided by the 1962 insured unemployment rate. For California, historic unemployment data obtained from the California Employment Development Department matched closely with the spliced series created here.

Real Exchange Rate: Exchange rate data from 1940-73 and the Mexican CPI were obtained from "Estadísticas Históricas de México", Third Edition, INEGI (1994):Aguascalientes. Annual average Exchange rate and CPI data for Mexico from 1970 onwards were obtained from the Bank of Mexico website www.banxico.gob.mx. U.S. CPI data were obtained for the entire period from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Distance to Major U.S. destination(s) for MMP communities: For each MMP community, the personal data information file was used to extract the most popular two locations in the U.S. for the first migrant trip. Then driving distance in miles from the MMP municipality to each of the two U.S. locations was then calculated from mapblast.com. Distance to the most popular location

and popularity-weighted average distance to the top two locations were both constructed for each community.

9 References

Adams, Richard H. (1989) "Workers remittances and inequality in rural Egypt", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 38, 1: 45-71.

Adams, Richard H. (1992) "The impact of migration and remittances on inequality in rural Pakistan", *Pakistan Development Review*, 31, 4: 1189-203.

Adelman, Irma, J. Edward Taylor and Stephen Vogel (1988) "Life in a Mexican Village: A SAM Perspective", *Journal of Development Studies* 25(1): 5-24.

Bardhan, Pranab, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1999) "Wealth Inequality, Wealth Constraints and Economic Performance", pp. 541-604 in A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon eds. *Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume I*, Elsevier: Amsterdam.

Barham, Bradford and Stephen Boucher (1998) "Migration, remittances and inequality: estimating the net effect of migration on income distribution", *Journal of Development Economics*, 55: 307-31.

Bénabou, Roland (1996) "Inequality and Growth", pp. 11-73 in B.S. Bernanke and J.J. Rotemberg (eds.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, MIT Press: Cambridge.

Carrington, W.J., E. Detragiache and T. Vishwanath (1996) "Migration with endogenous moving costs", *American Economic Review*, 86 (4): 909-30.

Chiquiar, Daniel and Gordon H. Hanson (2002) "International Migration, Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States", mimeo. UCSD.

Durand, Jorge, Emilio A. Parrado and Douglas S. Massey "Migradollars and Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case", *International Migration Review* 30(2): 423-444.

Espinosa, Kristin and Douglas Massey (1997) "Undocumented Migration and the Quantity and Quality of Social Capital", *Soziale Welt* 12: 141-162.

Escobar Latapí, Agustín, Philip Martin, Paul S. Davies, Gustavo López Castro and Katharine Donato (1998) "Factors that Influence Migration", pp. 163-250 in *Migration Between Mexico and the United States: Binational Study Volume 1.* U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform: Washington, D.C.

Filmer, Deon and Lant H. Pritchett (2001) "Estimating Wealth Effects Without Expenditure Data - Or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India", *Demography* 38(1): 115-132.

Foerster, Robert F. (1925) The Racial Problems Involved in Immigration from Latin America and the West Indies to the United States, United States Department of Labor.

González Navarro, Moisés (1974) *Población y Sociedad en México 1900-1970*. Universidad Autónoma de México Press: Mexico City.

Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond Robertson and Antonio Spilimbergo (2002) "Does Border Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers from Illegal Immigration?", The Review of Economics and Statistics 84(1): 73-92.

Hanson, Gordon H. and Antonio Spilimbergo (1999) "Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border", *The American Economic Review* 89(5): 1337-57.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) (1994) ENADID Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, 1992 Metodología y Tabulados, INEGI: Aguascalientes

McKenzie, David J. (2003) "Measuring Inequality with Asset Indicators", BREAD Working Paper No. 042.

Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand and Nolan J. Malone (2002) Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration, Russell Sage Foundation: New York.

Massey, Douglas S. and Kristin E. Espinosa (1997) "What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis", *American Journal of Sociology* 102(4): 939-999.

Massey, Douglas .S, Luin Goldring and Jorge Durand (1994) "Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities", *American Journal of Sociology*, 99, 6: 1492-1533.

Massey, Douglas S. and Rene Zenteno (2000) "A Validation of the Ethnosurvey: The Case of Mexico-U.S. Migration", *International Migration Review* 34(3): 766-793.

Milanovic, Branko (1987) "Remittances and income distribution", *Journal* of *Economic Studies*, 14(5): 24-37.

Mishra, Prachi (2003) "Effect of Emigration on Wages in Developing Countries: Evidence from Mexico", Mimeo. Columbia University.

Munshi, Kaivan. (2003) "Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor Market", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118(2): 549-599.

Rapoport, Hillel and Frédéric Docquier (2003a) "The economics of migrants' remittances" in S.-C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds.: *Handbook of the Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism*, Amsterdam: North-Holland, forth-coming.

Rapoport, Hillel and Frédéric Docquier (2003b) "Remittances and Inequality: A Dynamic Migration Model", Stanford Center for International Development (SCID) Working Paper No. 167.

Stark, Oded (1982) "Research on Rural-to-urban Migration in LDCs: The Confusion Frontier and Why we Should Pause to Rethink Afresh", *World Development* 10(1): 63-70.

Stark, Oded, J.Edward Taylor and Shlomo Yitzhaki (1986) "Remittances and inequality", *Economic Journal*, 96(383): 722-40.

Stark, Oded, J.Edward Taylor and Shlomo Yitzhaki (1988) "Migration, remittances and inequality: a sensitivity analysis using the extended Gini index", *Journal of Development Economics*, 28: 309-22.

Taylor, J. Edward (1992) "Remittances and Inequality Reconsidered: Direct, Indirect, and Intertemporal Effects", *Journal of Policy Modeling* 14(2): 187-208. Taylor J.Edward and T.J. Wyatt (1996) "The Shadow Value of Migrant Remittances, Income and Inequality in a Household-farm Economy", *Journal of Development Studies*, 32(6), 899-912.

U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (USCIR) (1998) Migration Between Mexico and the United States: Binational Study, USCIR: Washington, D.C.

Verbeek, Marno and Theo E. Nijman (1992) "Can Cohort Data be treated as genuine panel data?", *Empirical Economics* 17, 9-23.

Woodruff, Christopher and Rene Zenteno (2001) "Remittances and Microenterprises in Mexico", Mimeo., UCSD.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES BY COMMUNITY

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.		Percentiles	
			25th	50th	75th
MMP SURVEY COMMUNITIES					
Migration measures for male heads aged 15-49					
Proportion making trip within three years of survey	0.230	0.299	0.048	0.126	0.293
Proportion of heads with migrant father	0.190	0.172	0.019	0.150	0.312
Proportion of heads with migrant mother	0.042	0.057	0.000	0.022	0.059
Proportion of heads with migrant brother	0.430	0.231	0.293	0.440	0.589
Proportion of heads with migrant sister	0.155	0.110	0.086	0.140	0.196
Community Migration measures					
Current migration prevalence	0.259	0.142	0.158	0.243	0.344
Migration Prevalence 15 years before	0.149	0.113	0.071	0.118	0.209
Proportion of HH heads with a migrant 15 years before	0.326	0.209	0.198	0.292	0.462
State migration rate in 1924	0.105	0.066	0.058	0.112	0.163
State migration rate in 1955-59	0.025	0.016	0.013	0.025	0.032
Demographics					
Proportion of heads aged under 30	0.115	0.046	0.080	0.110	0.150
Proportion of heads aged over 60	0.241	0.067	0.198	0.240	0.285
Proportion of heads with education <6 years	0.630	0.191	0.500	0.602	0.750
Proportion of heads with education \geq 9 years	0.161	0.112	0.065	0.140	0.245
Wealth and Inequality					
Community mean of Asset Index	-0.506	1.345	-1.130	-0.179	0.511
Community mean of Predicted Ln Non-durable Consumption	8.754	0.270	8.588	8.776	8.945
Community mean of Predicted Non-durable Consumption	8349	2226	6649	8447	10099
Community mean of Predicted Income	7297	2291	5798	6878	8599
Relative Asset Inequality (I _c)	0.871	0.171	0.763	0.882	0.954
Gini of Non-durable consumption	0.406	0.025	0.389	0.404	0.420
Gini of Income	0.443	0.026	0.429	0.442	0.461
Other community variables					
Number of bank branches	3.8	7.0	1.0	2.0	4.0
Mean real coyote payment 1970-98	3.4	1.0	2.7	3.3	3.8
Minutes to Federal Highway	14.2	21.6	0.0	5.0	20.0
Distance in miles to principal US destination	1715.2	473.4	1646.7	1721.6	1855.3
ENADID MATCHED MUNICIPALITIES					
Gini of non-durable consumption 1997	0.403	0.017	0.390	0.404	0.413
Gini of non-durable consumption 1992	0.406	0.017	0.395	0.406	0.416
Gini NDC 1997 - Gini NDC 1992	-0.003	0.021	-0.015	-0.002	0.009
Gini of income 1997	0.452	0.020	0.441	0.453	0.462
Gini of income 1992	0.448	0.014	0.438	0.448	0.456
Relative Asset Inequality (I _c) 1997	0.868	0.186	0.770	0.914	0.976
Relative Asset Inequality (I _c) 1992	0.792	0.212	0.644	0.831	0.968
Migration Prevalence 1997	0.093	0.091	0.011	0.053	0.157
Migration Prevalence 1992	0.080	0.077	0.009	0.055	0.139
Change in Migration Prevalence 1992-97	0.013	0.048	-0.009	0.003	0.040
Proportion of Households with a Migrant 1997	0.211	0.192	0.034	0.160	0.368
Proportion of Households with a Migrant 1992	0.169	0.152	0.023	0.130	0.309

Notes: MMP summary statistics are for the 57 communities in MMP71 with 1990 population below 100,000 ENADID summary statistics are for the 97 municipalities with populations less than 100,000 that can be matched

TABLE 2: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT AND ASSET INDICATOR SUMMARY STATISTICS

MMP Principal Components Index

	Scoring			Means by	Tercile of A	sset Index
	Factors	Mean	S.D.	lowest	middle	upper
Housing Characteristics						
Number of rooms/member	0.154	1.082	0.962	0.737	1.028	1.477
Brick and cement or tile roof	0.167	0.758	0.428	0.590	0.856	0.840
Dirt floor	-0.282	0.113	0.317	0.316	0.014	0.000
Wood or tile floor	0.266	0.434	0.496	0.104	0.374	0.821
Utilities						
Running water	0.198	0.941	0.236	0.841	0.983	0.999
Sewerage	0.277	0.768	0.422	0.478	0.870	0.986
Electricity	0.199	0.971	0.168	0.917	0.999	1.000
Telephone	0.258	0.251	0.434	0.007	0.109	0.649
Durable Assets						
Car	0.193	0.187	0.390	0.024	0.106	0.439
Van	0.147	0.183	0.387	0.044	0.168	0.344
Radio	0.162	0.906	0.292	0.797	0.934	0.988
Television	0.264	0.893	0.309	0.703	0.986	0.999
Sewing Machine	0.225	0.475	0.499	0.195	0.473	0.751
Stove	0.276	0.922	0.269	0.769	0.999	1.000
Fridge	0.343	0.670	0.470	0.169	0.855	0.996
Washing Machine	0.310	0.506	0.500	0.079	0.528	0.920
Stereo	0.284	0.454	0.498	0.093	0.398	0.875
Overall Asset Index		0.000	2.154	-2.472	0.363	2.109

Share of variance 0.273

Notes: for all 71 communities in MMP71

ENADID 1992 and 1997 Principal Components Index

	Scoring			Means by	Tercile of A	sset Index
	Factors	Mean	S.D.	lowest	middle	upper
Asset Indicators						
House has a dirt floor	-0.278	0.208	0.406	0.469	0.115	0.013
House has a wood/tile floor	0.313	0.154	0.361	0.001	0.064	0.411
Water piped into house	0.455	0.363	0.481	0.002	0.147	0.971
Water from pipe outside house	-0.286	0.426	0.494	0.621	0.620	0.021
House has a toilet	0.390	0.628	0.483	0.092	0.855	0.998
Toilet connected to running water	0.450	0.341	0.474	0.001	0.192	0.863
Water drains to pipe	0.360	0.315	0.465	0.005	0.296	0.676
Water drains to septic tank	0.087	0.190	0.392	0.054	0.255	0.276
House has electric lighting	0.211	0.899	0.301	0.754	0.963	0.998
Overall Asset Index		0.000	1.843	-1.895	-0.246	2.324
Figenvalue for 1st component	2 207					
Eigenvalue for 1st component	3.397					
Share of Variance	0.377					

Notes: For 97 municipalities with population 100,000 or less which can be matched in the 1992 and 1997 surveys.

TABLE 3 - PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD'S MIGRATION DECISION

	Probability	of a Migrar	nt Trip in the	e 3 years pr	ior to the su	irvey year		Prob. Migra	ate in Year t	
Household Characteristics	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Log of non-durable consumption	2.7650	2.4626	2.0112	1.4177	1.4088	1.4696	0.2715	0.2894	0.2935	
Log NDC Squared	(4.85)** -0.1563	(4.22)** -0.1348	(4.15)** -0.1111	(3.47)** -0.0789	(3.55)** -0.0754	(4.08)** -0.0783	(3.69)** -0.0141	(3.68)** -0.0150	(4.34)** -0.0153	
Log NDC * Age of Head	(4.84)**	(4.08)**	(4.04)**	(3.41)**	(3.32)** -0.0014	(3.79)** -0.0014	(3.38)** -0.0001	(3.37)** -0.0002	(4.00)** -0.0001	
Household Head's Characteristics Education (years)		-0.0119	-0.0064	-0.0018	(3.63)** -0.0020	(3.44)** -0.0038	(2.43)* 0.0007	(3.48)** 0.0007	(3.95)** 0.0009	0.0031
Education Squared		(3.61)** -0.0001	(1.83) -0.0003	(0.70) -0.0002	(0.76) -0.0003	(1.42) -0.0001	(0.96) -0.0002	(0.96) -0.0002	(1.64) -0.0002	(5.68)** -0.0003
Married		(0.59) 0.0078	(1.21) 0.0127	(1.43) -0.0142	(1.54) -0.0128	(0.82) -0.0203	(5.28)** -0.0001	(5.37)** -0.0001	(5.95)** -0.0005	(7.62)** -0.0006
Number of Children Aged under 18		(0.26) -0.0033	(0.43) -0.0058	(0.55) -0.0022	(0.50) -0.0021	(0.72) -0.0033	(0.04) 0.0005	(0.03) 0.0004	(0.25) 0.0003	(0.31) 0.0007
Has migrated previously ¹		(1.29)	(2.33)*	(0.98) 0.1544	(0.91) 0.1534	(1.41) 0.1465	(1.11) 0.0817	(1.05) 0.0810	(1.00) 0.0742	(1.82) 0.0773
<i>Personal Migrant Network</i> Father is a migrant ¹				(10.14)**	(10.69)**	(10.12)** 0.0060	(18.49)** 0.0048	(18.71)**	(18.52)** 0.0053	(18.90)** 0.0067
Mother is a migrant ¹				(0.13) 0.0066	(0.09) 0.0048	(0.50) 0.0072	(2.28)* 0.0109	(2.30)* 0.0109	(3.02)** 0.0071	(3.38)** 0.0075
Has a migrant brother ¹				(0.36) 0.0339	(0.27) 0.0327 (2.46)*	(0.37) 0.0244 (1.80)	(1.69) 0.0174 (7.82)**	(1.63) 0.0174 (7.80)**	(1.22) 0.0164	(1.26) 0.0171
Has a migrant sister ¹				(2.53)* 0.0182	(2.46)* 0.0179	(1.89) 0.0070	(7.82)** 0.0084	(7.80)** 0.0085	(9.80)** 0.0064 (2.20)*	(10.00)** 0.0074
<i>Community Migrant Network</i> State Migration rate in 1924			0.9473	(1.64) 0.2695	(1.67) 0.2862	(0.54)	(2.97)** 0.0092	(2.96)** 0.0105	(2.30)*	(2.42)*
Proportion of households with a migrant 20 years before			(4.51)**	(1.80) 0.2513 (4.79)**	(1.96)* 0.0081 (0.06)		(0.26)	(0.28)		
Propn. of hhs with migrant 20 yrs ago * age of head				(0.0066 (2.12)*	0.0073 (2.49)*				
Proportion of other heads with migrant experience at t-1					()	()	0.1090 (8.35)**	0.1092 (7.78)**	0.0858 (4.60)**	0.0680 (3.31)**
Proportion of other heads with experience * age of head							-0.0001 (0.18)	-0.0000 (0.07)	-0.0003 (0.69)	-0.0002 (0.53)
Community Characteristics Number of Bank Branches		0.0007 (0.31)	-0.0001 (0.09)	0.0011 (1.59)	0.0012 (1.66)		-0.0003 (1.66)	-0.0003 (1.52)	、 ,	χ <i>γ</i>
Mean Real Coyote Payment 1970-98		0.0075	()	()	()		()	()		
Any money lenders in community		-0.0160 (0.34)								
Train Station in Community		0.0009 (0.02)								
Number of Post Offices in community		0.0002 (0.20)								
Proportion with less than min. wage in 1970		-0.0140 (0.12)	0.0724 (0.69)	0.1021 (1.61)	0.1042 (1.68)		0.0071 (0.64)	0.0074 (0.67)		
Proportion in Agriculture in 1970		0.1327 (0.69)	(,		()		(***)	()		
Minutes to Federal Highway		0.0009 (1.24)	0.0010 (1.54)	0.0007 (2.51)*	0.0006 (2.51)*		0.0001 (0.76)	0.0001 (0.92)		
Distance to principal destination in U.S.		-0.0001 (1.76)	-0.0000 (1.63)	-0.0000 (1.14)	-0.0000 (1.18)		-0.0000 (1.95)	-0.0000 (1.94)		
Aggregate Time-varying variables Average real depreciation over current and last year		· · - /	()	、···/	()		()	-0.0002 (3.07)**	-0.0002 (4.70)**	-0.0002 (4.62)**
Average US unemployment rate over current and last year								0.0002	0.0007	0.0008
Community Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	(0.21) No	(1.52) Yes	(1.61) Yes
Observations Number of Communities in Sample	4165	3514 45	3541 49	3541 49	3541 49	3665 48	120731 49	114613 49	131463 54	133443 57
Pseudo-R2	57 0.025	45 0.077	49 0.110	49 0.223	49 0.227	48 0.234	49 0.249	49 0.249	54 0.261	57 0.254

Notes: Coefficients reported represent the change in the probability of migration for a discrete change in the dummy variables and for an infinitesimal change in the continuous variables at the mean. T-statistics in parentheses, with robust standard errors clustered at the community level, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% All probits except column 1 also include dummy variables for 5-year age group of the household head and are for male household heads

currently in Mexico and aged 15-49 years. 1. For columns (4)-(6) is for migrant status three years before survey year, for columns (7)-(10) is for year before survey

Table 4 - Further Robustness Checks for Table 3

Result of adding additional variables one-by-one to Models 5, 7 and 9 in Table 3

	Mo	del 5	Mo	del 6	Мо	del 9
	T-stat	p-value	T-stat	p-value	T-stat	p-value
Log NDC cubed	-0.06	0.951	-0.76	0.445	0.07	0.941
Log NDC squared * Age of Head	1.24	0.216	1.43	0.153	-0.11	0.911
Log NDC * state 1924 migration rate	0.68	0.5	1.05	0.292	0.09	0.929
Log NDC * Previously a Migrant	0.18	0.857	0.46	0.647	2.58	0.01
Log NDC * Community Migration 20 years ago	1.52	0.129	1.49	0.137		
Age * Previously a Migrant	0.59	0.558	0.29	0.772	-1.41	0.159
Age * Education of Head	-1.49	0.136	0.04	0.969	-2.14	0.032
Education * Community Migration 20 years ago	-0.37	0.713	-0.36	0.722		
Education * Previously a Migrant	0.54	0.592	0.41	0.679	-0.35	0.727
Distance to Destination Squared	1.73	0.084				
Average real depreciation * Log NDC					0.58	0.565

TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS

	Migration Prev	alence Ratio	Welch test	t of equality
	<0.24	0.24 +	of m	leans
Migrants helped to finance:	Proportion of	Communities	t-stat	p-value
Electricity	0.00	0.12	-1.81	0.083
Water	0.05	0.15	-1.23	0.226
Lighting	0.05	0.12	-0.85	0.400
Churches	0.10	0.39	-2.60	0.013
School	0.00	0.12	-1.81	0.083
Plaza	0.05	0.21	-1.85	0.071
Number of communities	21	26		

5A: Migrant Participation in Community Infrastructure by Migration Prevalence

Source: own calculations from MMP71 for communities with 100,000 or less population in 1990 Communities with unknown as a response are dropped from this analysis.

5B: Method by which migrants obtained their last job in the U.S.

	Migration Pre	valence Ratio	Welch test	t of equality
Last U.S. job obtained by:	<0.24	0.24 +	of m	eans
	percent of	f migrants	t-stat	p-value
searching oneself	24.4	19.6	16.42	0.000
recommendation from relative	21.2	22.4	-4.34	0.000
recommendation from friend	18.0	21.4	-12.37	0.000
recommendation from fellow community member	4.0	5.3	-8.92	0.000
contracted	23.5	21.1	8.06	0.000

Notes: all heads aged 15 or over in survey period with migrant experience For MMP71 communities with less than 100,000 population in 1990.

TABLE 6: OLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF PAST MIGRATION ON CURRENT INEQUALITY

	Gini d	of Non-dura	ble Consun	nption	Re	elative Inequ	uality in Ass	ets		Gini of I	ncome	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	. (4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Migration Prevalence 15 years before	0.008	-0.024	-0.057	-0.109	-0.289	-0.983	-0.799	-1.729	-0.019	-0.185	-0.076	-0.229
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(1.28)	(1.06)	(1.76)	(1.55)	(3.30)**	(2.89)**	(0.56)	(1.89)	(1.75)	(2.37)*
Migration Prevalence Squared		0.075		0.125		1.677		2.210		0.401		0.364
		(0.30)		(0.54)		(1.21)		(1.76)		(1.78)		(1.65)
Proportion of heads aged under 30			0.114	0.118			-0.065	0.014			0.046	0.059
			(1.08)	(1.09)			(0.12)	(0.03)			(0.45)	(0.54)
Proportion of heads aged over 60			0.142	0.143			0.766	0.779			0.190	0.192
			(2.06)*	(2.04)*			(1.65)	(1.69)			(2.84)**	(2.73)**
Proportion of heads with education <6 years			0.009	0.013			0.364	0.443			-0.039	-0.026
			(0.24)	(0.33)			(1.46)	(1.67)			(1.13)	(0.69)
Proportion of heads with education ≥9 years			-0.046	-0.040			0.009	0.116			-0.054	-0.036
			(0.82)	(0.67)			(0.02)	(0.30)			(0.91)	(0.58)
Constant	0.405	0.407	0.369	0.368	0.914	0.960	0.583	0.566	0.446	0.457	0.437	0.434
	(73.82)**	(53.24)**	(8.92)**	(8.74)**	(25.99)**	(18.81)**	(2.43)*	(2.32)*	(73.80)**	(53.07)**	(12.27)**	(11.80)**
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
R-squared	0.001	0.003	0.135	0.141	0.037	0.059	0.231	0.268	0.007	0.064	0.156	0.200

Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Source: Own calculations from MMP71 communities with less than 100,000 population in 1990.

TABLE 7: FIRST-STAGE IV RESULTS FOR MIGRATION PREVALENCE

		Migratio	n Prevaler	nce 15 year	s before			Migi	ration Prev	alence Squ	ared	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Instruments												
State Migration rate in 1924	0.685		0.001	0.634		0.095	0.270		-0.561	0.249		-0.366
	(3.25)**		(0.00)	(3.53)**		(0.45)	(2.69)**		(1.33)	(2.90)**		(0.88)
State Migration rate in 1924 Squared									3.783			2.930
									(1.71)			(1.49)
Weighted past State-level unemployment in US 16-25 years before	-0.051		-0.033	-0.005		0.033	-0.006		-0.012	0.015		0.013
Weighted Deal Description area 10,00 years before average	(1.70)		(1.08)	(0.15)		(1.10)	(0.52)		(0.94)	(1.13)		(0.81)
Weighted Real Depreciation over 16-30 years before survey	-0.068		-0.014	-0.071		-0.026	-0.031		-0.030	-0.034		-0.032
Otata Minustian asta in 1055 50	(1.42)	4 00 4	(0.29)	(1.84)	0 500	(0.68)	(1.58)	0 500	(1.51)	(2.05)*	4 405	(1.87)
State Migration rate in 1955-59		4.394 (5.97)**	3.692 (3.41)**		3.583 (7.21)**	3.263 (4.49)**		-0.536			-1.125 (1.24)	
State Migration rate in 1955-59 Squared		(5.97)	(3.41)		(7.21)	(4.49)		(0.46) 38.402			(1.24) 41.740	
State Migration rate in 1955-59 Squared												
Distance in Miles to Principal US destination (*1000)			0.188			.015		(1.84)	0.069		(2.67)*	-0.010
Distance in Miles to Philicipal 05 destination (1000)			(1.96)			(0.16)			(1.86)			(0.24)
Distance in Miles Sourced (*10 ⁶)			-0.057			009			-0.024			-0.001
Distance in Miles Squared (*10 ⁶)			-0.057 (2.17)*			009 (0.37)			-0.024 (2.24)*			-0.001 (0.07)
Included Exogenous Variables			(2.17)			(0.57)			(2.24)			(0.07)
Proportion of heads aged under 30				0.188	0.351	0.435				0.118	0.100	0.072
r toponion of fieldus aged under oo				(0.62)	(1.37)	(1.45)				(0.84)	(0.81)	(0.44)
Proportion of heads aged over 60				1.026	0.940	1.017				0.469	0.361	0.431
r topolition of fieldus aged over ou				(4.50)**	(4.84)**	(4.49)**				(3.89)**	(3.26)**	(3.24)**
Proportion of heads with education <6 years				0.057	0.156	0.134				-0.007	0.055	0.019
r reportion of house with outdation to youro				(0.56)	(1.73)	(1.42)				(0.13)	(1.45)	(0.41)
Proportion of heads with education ≥9 years				0.010	0.135	0.123				-0.044	0.015	-0.030
				(0.06)	(0.90)	(0.84)				(0.53)	(0.23)	(0.39)
Constant	0.159	0.038	-0.036	-0.213	-0.328	-0.389	0.017	0.015	0.013	-0.129	-0.109	-0.090
	(2.77)**	(2.07)*	(0.40)	(1.61)	(3.66)**	(2.93)**	(0.75)	(1.45)	(0.37)	(1.95)	(2.31)*	(1.23)
	· · ·	()	()	()	· · ·	()	()	()	,	· · /	()	()
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
R-squared	0.24	0.36	0.40	0.57	0.66	0.67	0.17	0.37	0.23	0.50	0.63	0.54
F-stat excluded instruments	5.68	31.44	5.62	4.96	32.12	5.33	3.52	15.79	2.48	3.84	16.03	2.48
p-value	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.035	0.015	0.000	0.037
Shea Partial R ² for excluded instruments	0.243	0.364	0.403	0.233	0.386	0.410	0.100	0.152	0.213	0.154	0.139	0.265
Instrument Set	А	В	С	А	В	С	А	D	Е	А	D	Е

Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Source: Own calculations from MMP71 communities with less than 100,000 population in 1990.

				Depender	t Variable:	Community	Gini of Nor	durable Co	nsumption			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Instrumented Endogenous Variables												
Migration Prevalence 15 years before	-0.007	-0.064	0.017	-0.106	-0.132	-0.112	0.232	0.159	0.245	-0.092	-0.052	0.076
	(0.10)	(1.28)	(0.45)	(1.23)	(2.28)*	(2.01)*	-0.99	-0.69	-1.54	(0.46)	(0.24)	(0.63)
Migration Prevalence Squared							-0.664	-0.545	-0.624	-0.036	-0.196	-0.520
							-1.05	-0.93	-1.3	(0.08)	(0.40)	(1.52)
Exogenous Regressors												
Proportion of heads aged under 30				0.132	0.141	0.203				0.131	0.134	0.169
				(1.15)	(1.31)	(2.08)*				(1.14)	(1.23)	(1.55)
Proportion of heads aged over 60				0.193	0.220	0.213				0.194	0.221	0.232
				(1.65)	(2.42)*	(2.46)*				(1.65)	(2.34)*	(2.20)*
Proportion of heads with education <6 years				0.016	0.019	0.025				0.014	0.013	0.003
				(0.47)	(0.57)	(0.77)				(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.07)
Proportion of heads with education ≥9 years				-0.047	-0.048	-0.036				-0.049	-0.057	-0.077
				(0.97)	(1.01)	(0.80)				(0.86)	(1.05)	(1.40)
Constant	0.407	0.416	0.403	0.358	0.353	0.338	0.395	0.402	0.390	0.358	0.353	0.349
	(39.67)**	(51.18)**	(66.09)**	(8.30)**	(8.52)**	(8.40)**	(26.11)**	(27.00)**	(40.61)**	(8.25)**	(8.28)**	(7.90)**
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
Instrument Set	А	В	С	А	В	С	A	D	E	А	D	Е
Overidentification J-statistic	1.048	n.a.	7.808	0.008	n.a.	5.261	0.012	n.a.	3.719	0.002	n.a.	2.939
p-value for overidentification test	0.592		0.167	0.996		0.385	0.912		0.445	0.966		0.568

TABLE 8: IV ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF PAST MIGRATION ON INEQUALITY IN NONDURABLE CONSUMPTION

Notes:

Robust t-statistics calculated from two-step efficient GMM estimation in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

n.a. not applicable as equation is exactly identified

Instrument Sets:

A: State migration rate in 1924, weighted state-level unemployment 16-25 years earlier (UE), Weighted Real Depreciation 16-30 years before survey (Real Depn.);

B: State migration rate in 1955-59

C: A+B+ Distance in miles to principal destination in U.S. and distance squared.

D: State migration rate in 1955-59, State migration rate in 1955-59 squared

E: A and state migration rate in 1924 squared.

			Depen	dent Variab	le: Relative	Inequality in	n Principal C	component	of Asset Ind	icators		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	. (8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Instrumented Endogenous Variables												
Migration Prevalence 15 years before	-0.762	-0.696	-0.385	-2.185	-1.200	-1.263	2.42	1.194	1.801	-0.299	-0.859	-0.925
	(1.81)	(2.25)*	(1.62)	(3.60)**	(3.31)**	(3.84)**	-1.25	-0.66	-1.59	(0.17)	(0.48)	(0.93)
Migration Prevalence Squared							-9.855	-4.62	-7.17	-5.088	-0.839	-2.360
							-1.63	-1.03	-1.78	(1.12)	(0.21)	(0.85)
Exogenous Regressors												
Proportion of heads aged under 30				0.523	0.078	0.091				0.360	0.052	0.489
				(0.75)	(0.15)	(0.17)				(0.46)	(0.09)	(0.76)
Proportion of heads aged over 60				2.339	1.180	1.396				2.461	1.187	2.397
				(3.38)**	(2.13)*	(2.69)**				(3.22)**	(2.14)*	(3.58)**
Proportion of heads with education <6 years				0.586	0.420	0.334				0.333	0.392	0.435
				(2.09)*	(1.81)	(1.54)				(0.86)	(1.40)	(1.50)
Proportion of heads with education ≥9 years				0.016	-0.002	-0.178				-0.363	-0.043	-0.198
				(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.54)				(0.62)	(0.11)	(0.45)
Constant	0.974	0.975	0.923	0.205	0.494	0.538	0.855	0.854	0.855	0.312	0.498	0.225
	(15.99)**	(18.46)**	(23.76)**	(0.73)	(2.21)*	(2.51)*	(8.14)**	(7.12)**	(18.20)**	(0.95)	(2.16)*	(0.82)
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
Instrument Set	А	В	С	А	В	С	А	D	E	А	D	E
Overidentification J-statistic	3.914	n.a.	6.869	2.393	n.a.	8.943	0.411	n.a.	2.958	0.885	n.a.	9.968
p-value for overidentification test	0.141		0.231	0.302		0.111	0.522		0.565	0.347		0.041

TABLE 9: IV ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF PAST MIGRATION ON INEQUALITY IN ASSET INDEX

Notes:

Robust t-statistics calculated from two-step efficient GMM estimation in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

n.a. not applicable as equation is exactly identified

Instrument Sets:

A: State migration rate in 1924, weighted state-level unemployment 16-25 years earlier (UE), Weighted Real Depreciation 16-30 years before survey (Real Depn.);

B: State migration rate in 1955-59

C: A+B+ Distance in miles to principal destination in U.S. and distance squared.

D: State migration rate in 1955-59, State migration rate in 1955-59 squared

E: A and state migration rate in 1924 squared.

					Dependent '	Variable: Co	ommunity G	ini of Incom	e			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Instrumented Endogenous Variables												
Migration Prevalence 15 years before	-0.130	-0.120	-0.093	-0.178	-0.174	-0.157	-0.225	-0.308	-0.091	-0.292	-0.332	-0.208
	(1.57)	(2.45)*	(2.45)*	(1.80)	(3.05)**	(3.18)**	(0.79)	(1.39)	(0.62)	(1.45)	(1.74)	(2.06)*
Migration Prevalence Squared							0.268	0.460	0.011	0.371	0.389	0.190
							(0.36)	(0.91)	(0.02)	(0.82)	(0.92)	(0.69)
Exogenous Regressors												
Proportion of heads aged under 30				0.057	0.081	0.030				0.057	0.093	0.032
				(0.48)	(0.76)	(0.31)				(0.45)	(0.83)	(0.30)
Proportion of heads aged over 60				0.325	0.292	0.299				0.249	0.289	0.262
				(2.32)*	(3.07)**	(3.66)**				(1.78)	(3.19)**	(2.68)**
Proportion of heads with education <6 years				-0.027	-0.025	-0.029				-0.007	-0.012	-0.017
				(0.92)	(0.83)	(1.07)				(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.50)
Proportion of heads with education ≥9 years				-0.060	-0.057	-0.054				-0.020	-0.038	-0.033
				(1.26)	(1.15)	(1.27)				(0.30)	(0.68)	(0.59)
Constant	0.463	0.461	0.456	0.412	0.415	0.418	0.468	0.473	0.456	0.414	0.413	0.416
	(34.54)**	(54.69)**	(77.12)**	(10.16)**	(11.50)**	(12.52)**	(23.63)**	(27.84)**	(56.88)**	(9.80)**	(11.44)**	(11.64)**
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
Instrument Set	А	В	С	А	В	С	А	D	E	A	D	E
Overidentification J-statistic	3.420	n.a.	3.673	4.208	n.a.	4.520	2.934	n.a.	3.464	4.290	n.a.	4.603
p-value for overidentification test	0.181		0.597	0.122		0.477	0.087		0.483	0.038		0.331

TABLE 10: IV ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF PAST MIGRATION ON INEQUALITY IN INCOME

Notes:

Robust t-statistics calculated from two-step efficient GMM estimation in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

n.a. not applicable as equation is exactly identified

Instrument Sets:

A: State migration rate in 1924, weighted state-level unemployment 16-25 years earlier (UE), Weighted Real Depreciation 16-30 years before survey (Real Depn.);

B: State migration rate in 1955-59

C: A+B+ Distance in miles to principal destination in U.S. and distance squared.

D: State migration rate in 1955-59, State migration rate in 1955-59 squared

E: A and state migration rate in 1924 squared.

TABLE 11: ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF MIGRATION

Coefficient on alternative measures of instrumented past migration

	Measure of Inequality										
Instrument Set	Gini of Nondurable Consumption		Relative Asset Inequality		Gini of Income		First-stage F-stat (p-value)		Overidentification test p-value		
									NDC	Assets	Income
	В	С	В	С	В	С	В	С	С	С	С
Original Specification											
Migration Prevalence 15 years before	-0.132	-0.112	-1.200	-1.263	-0.174	-0.157	32.12	5.33	0.385	0.111	0.477
	(2.28)*	(2.01)*	(3.31)**	(3.84)**	(3.05)**	(3.18)**	(0.000)	(0.000)			
Alternative Measure of Migration Used:											
Migration Prevalence 5 years before	-0.147	-0.105	-1.339	-1.499	-0.194	-0.174	15.91	2.64	0.338	0.171	0.477
	(2.32)*	(1.85)	(2.92)**	(3.59)**	(2.94)**	(2.92)**	(0.000)	(0.028)			
Migration Prevalence 10 years before	-0.137	-0.108	-1.249	-1.438	-0.181	-0.165	21.19	3.70	0.372	0.177	0.473
	(2.29)*	(1.91)	(3.14)**	(3.85)**	(3.01)**	(3.01)**	(0.000)	(0.004)			
Migration Prevalence 20 years before	-0.150	-0.133	-1.366	-1.378	-0.198	-0.178	36.50	5.99	0.415	0.112	0.484
	(2.27)*	(2.12)*	(3.50)**	(4.22)**	(3.02)**	(3.34)**	(0.000)	(0.000)			
Proportion of households with a	-0.075	-0.060	-0.682	-0.688	-0.099	-0.085	31.59	5.09	0.259	0.050	0.431
migrant 15 years before	(2.42)*	(1.97)*	(3.59)**	(3.99)**	(3.19)**	(3.30)**	(0.000)	(0.000)			
Proportion of households with a	-0.079	-0.062	-0.722	-0.826	-0.105	-0.093	21.94	3.60	0.261	0.087	0.438
migrant 10 years before	(2.42)*	(1.91)	(3.50)**	(4.45)**	(3.11)**	(3.14)**	(0.000)	(0.005)			
Proportion of households with a	-0.087	-0.079	-0.791	-0.961	-0.115	-0.123	15.36	2.87	0.347	0.088	0.655
migrant 5 years before	(2.44)*	(2.28)*	(3.27)**	(4.22)**	(2.83)**	(3.16)**	(0.000)	(0.019)			

Notes:

Coefficients shown are for the migration measure in an IV regression of the inequality measure on the migration measure, the proportion of heads aged under 30 and over 60, the proportion of heads with education <6 years and \geq 9 years and a constant

Robust t-statistics after two-stage efficient GMM estimation in parentheses.

* denotes significant at 5%, ** at 1%

Instrument Sets:

A: State migration rate in 1924, weighted state-level unemployment 16-25 years earlier (UE), Weighted Real Depreciation 16-30 years before survey (Real Depn.);

B: State migration rate in 1955-59

C: A+B+ Distance in miles to principal destination in U.S. and distance squared.

Table 12: Is a change in migration associated with a change in inequality? Results from 1992 and 1997 ENADID data

	Char	nge in Gini d	f Non-durable Consumption				Change in IC		Change in Gini of Income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Median	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Change in Migration Stock 1992-97	-0.001	0.007	0.054	0.213		0.309	2.29		0.208	
	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.61)	(1.83)*		(2.15)**	(1.41)		(1.77)*	
Change in Migration Stock * 1992 Stock			-0.419	-1.247		-1.687	-10.284		-0.984	
			(0.72)	(2.01)*		(2.31)**	(1.20)		(1.58)	
Change in Proportion of Hhs with Migrant			、	· · ·	0.105	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		1.494	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	0.138
					(1.72)*			(1.83)*		(2.38)**
Change in Propn of Hhs with Migrant * 1992 Propn,					-0.354			-4.461		-0.422
					(1.73)*			(1.62)		(2.15)**
Constant	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	0.038	0.036	0.005	0.005
	(1.43)	(0.87)	(1.53)	(1.34)	(1.11)	(0.44)	(1.15)	(1.05)	(2.21)**	(2.11)**
Observations	97	33	97	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.10		0.06	0.10	0.09	0.16
Predicted Turning Point in Migration Stock			0.13	0.17		0.18	0.22		0.21	
Predicted Turning Point in Propn of Hhs					0.30			0.33		0.33

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%